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I. INTRODUCTION 
To what extent have the laws, institutions, policies, and ideologies 
of the colonial state survived the end of colonial rule? These 
questions about “colonial continuity” have been of great interest to 
scholars of post-colonial legal systems.1 Questions about colonial 
      *Arudra Burra (burra@hss.iitd.ac.in) is Assistant Professor of Philosophy in 
the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Indian Institute of 
Technology-Delhi (IIT Delhi). He has a Ph.D. in philosophy from Princeton 
University (2011), and a J.D. from the Yale Law School (2007). Before joining IIT 
Delhi, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Program in Law and Philosophy at the 
UCLA Law School.  
 1.  See, e.g., Sandipto Dasgupta, A Language Which is Foreign to Us: 
Continuities and Anxieties in the Making of the Indian Constitution, 34 COMP. 
STUD. S. ASIA, AFR. & MIDDLE E. 228, 228 (2014) (stating that colonial continuity 
plays a central role in a nation which transitions to postcolonial constitutionalism).  
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continuity also play a role in normative criticism of contemporary 
laws and institutions, since the origins of a law or institution within 
the colonial state are often used to attack their presence in the post-
colonial state.  This article argues that, despite its ubiquity in 
academic and political discourse, the concept of “colonial 
continuity” can obscure thinking about post-colonial laws and 
institutions in important ways. This is because the category of the 
“colonial” is itself a problematic conceptual category when applied 
to laws and institutions in India’s colonial past. 
There are at least three ways in which the term “colonial 
continuity” (or some cognate term, such as “colonial inheritance” or 
“colonial legacy”) figures in contemporary discourse. In the first 
sense it is used to explain or diagnose some present-day ill.2 
Sometimes this diagnosis involves an exercise of shifting blame. Dr. 
B. R. Ambedkar warned against  in his famous closing address to the 
Constituent Assembly, in which he said “[b]y independence, we have 
lost the excuse of blaming the British for anything going wrong. If 
hereafter things go wrong, we will have nobody to blame except 
ourselves.”3 This point has been echoed more recently by scholars 
such as Andre Béteille.4 
Colonial continuities are also invoked  to criticise contemporary 
laws and institutions: the fact that an institution or law is a “colonial 
inheritance” is sometimes taken to be a reason to get rid of it, or to 
alter its character.5 Thus, one of the challenges to section 377 of the 
 2.  Cf. Anil Kalhan et al., Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism, 
and Security Laws in India, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93, 125 (2006) (claiming the 
extraordinary legal procedures India uses in non-emergency situations  can be 
traced to colonial policies for preventing security threats).  
 3.  The Constituent Assembly of India, Debate on the Government of India 
Act (Amendment) Bill (Nov. 25, 1949) (transcript available at 
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol11p11.htm). 
 4.  See Andre Béteille, Constitutional Morality, ECON. & POL. WKLY., Oct. 4–
10, 2008 at 35 (“[M]ost [Constituent Assembly members] had by then acquired the 
convenient habit of attributing every Indian misfortune to the misdeeds of colonial 
rule. It does not speak well of us to shift the burden of responsibility for all our 
contradictions and dilemmas on to some external agency, acting either directly or 
indirectly though forces over which we ourselves never seem to acquire control.”).   
 5.  A criticism which has been applied to the constitution as a whole. See 
Rohit De, Constitutional Antecedents, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE INDIAN 
CONSTITUTION  [hereinafter De, Constitutional Antecedents] (noting the criticism 
that the Indian constitution was merely a “slavish imitation” of Western 
 
   
2016] WHAT IS “COLONIAL” 139 
Indian Penal Code (criminalizing sexual activities “against the order 
of nature”) – has been that it is a “vestige of the colonial order.”6 
Interestingly, this form of political argument is compatible with a 
range of political ideologies. Thus, at the other end of the ideological 
spectrum from Naz Foundation, the chief of the Hindu rightwing 
group, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (“RSS”) in 2000 
denounced the Constitution as a whole as no more than a 
continuation of the Government of India Act, 1935, a colonial 
statute.7 
A third use of the term “colonial continuity” concerns the survival 
within the post-colonial state of institutions such as the police or the 
civil service.8 These institutions were instruments of colonial control 
and repression and had a long history of conflict with the nationalist 
movement. Yet this nationalist movement, whose criticism of 
colonial rule rested in part on a criticism of these institutions, chose 
to retain them after the end of colonial rule. This attempt to fulfill 
post-colonial ambitions through what one commentator called “the 
trained servants of imperialism” has seemed to some scholars to be a 
paradox or puzzle to be explained.9 
This puzzle, in turn, leads to a lament: given the history of this 
anti-colonial opposition to colonial institutions, their survival into the 
post-colonial state is seen then as a political failure. Indeed, the 
failure of the post-colonial state to live up to some of its ambitions 
has in turn been attributed to the colonial origins of some of its 
institutions, thus leading us back to the first use of the term “colonial 
constitutions).  
 6.  Naz Foundation vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors., civil writ petition 
7455/2001. Many thanks to Siddharth Narrain for making the petitions available.  
In written submissions to the Court, the Alternative Law Forum argued that “while 
disgust and revulsion may have been a valid ground for colonial rulers to legislate 
by decree, it is clearly not the case in a civilized society governed by a 
Constitution.” Id.  
 7.  Sumit Sarkar, Indian democracy: the historical inheritance in THE 
SUCCESS OF INDIA’S DEMOCRACY 23, 25 (Atul Kohli ed., 1966); see also De, 
Constitutional Antecedents, supra note 5, at 1-2. 
 8.  See generally DAVID ARNOLD, POLICE POWER AND COLONIAL RULE: 
MADRAS 1859-1947 (1986); DAVID C. POTTER, INDIA’S POLITICAL 
ADMINISTRATORS: 1919-1983 (1986). 
 9.  Seminarist, “Self before Service,” Seminar 84 (1966), quoted in POTTER, 
supra note 8, at 2. See ARNOLD, supra note 8, at 185 (context of the police); 
POTTER, supra note 8, at 2 (context of the Indian Civil Service). 
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continuity” described above.10 
This article argues that the persistence of institutions such as the 
police and the bureaucracy seems puzzling only against the 
background of a nationalist narrative in which Indian independence 
is seen through the lens of conflict with the institutions of colonial 
rule. If the battle was fought (in part) to get rid of the institutions, 
then their persistence is a sign of defeat.11 
This nationalist narrative takes the history of the anti-colonial 
movement to be primarily one of extra-constitutional conflict 
between the Congress and the British Raj, – particularly during the 
Gandhi-led mass agitations of 1919, 1930-31, and 1942.12  In Part II, 
this article argues that this narrative obscures important periods of 
pre-1947 constitutional history which involved the nationalist 
leadership in the role of a constitutional party working within the 
framework of the colonial state. 
This point is illustrated by two case-studies involving the 
workings of the Congress Ministries elected under the 1935 
Government of India Act (“India Act”). On both the legislative and 
executive sides the nationalist leadership worked within a framework 
established (and confined) by the colonial state. But during this 
period legislatures (elected on the basis of an admittedly limited 
franchise) did pass laws and the Ministries did have some limited 
control over the police and the bureaucracy.13 Were the laws passed 
by these legislatures or the executive decisions made by these 
Ministries “colonial” laws or not? To ask the question is to see that 
the colonial versus anti-colonial (and therefore the colonial versus 
post-colonial) framework is inadequate to describe the constitutional 
history of the late-colonial state. 
 
 10.  See POTTER, supra note 8; Kalhan et al., supra note 2, at 112 (quoting a 
former police officer as saying that “the Raj lives on” in the police institutions of 
contemporary India). 
 11.  See Arudra Burra, The Cobwebs of Imperial Rule, SEMINAR 615, Nov. 
2010, 79, 79-80 [hereinafter Burra, Cobwebs] (noting once independence was 
attained, many members previously serving under the British Raj became 
important contributors to the new regime). 
 12.  See generally CONGRESS & THE RAJ: FACETS OF THE INDIAN STRUGGLE 
1917-47 1-46 (D.A. Low ed., 1977).  
 13.  ARNOLD, supra note 8, at 185. 
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Part III extends this argument and claims that even in the colonial 
period these institutions of the police, the bureaucracy, and the 
Courts had a life which was to some extent autonomous of their 
origins within the colonial state and of their role in suppressing the 
nationalist movement. Thus the interests of the colonial state in 
maintaining colonial power did not always align with the interests of 
the institutions through which this power was to be retained. This 
claim is illustrated by two case-studies, one involving a conflict 
between the Federal Court of India and the Executive regarding 
wartime legislation curbing civil liberties, and the other involving 
conflict within the Indian Civil Service regarding the best way to 
implement the 1935 Act.14 
The fact that there were conflicts both between as well as within 
colonial institutions15 suggest that the fact that they were institutions 
of the colonial state did not entirely determine how they functioned. 
To understand their functioning we must also understand their nature 
as institutions, governed by values and norms which might not 
always serve the interests of the colonial state. Thus to describe these 
merely as “colonial” is to locate them exclusively in the nationalist 
narrative of continuous conflict described above. But this tells less 
about their functioning than one might initially think. Paying 
attention to them as institutions which saw themselves as to some 
extent “politically neutral” gives an additional purchase on 
understanding their persistence into the post-colonial state; there is a 
logic of institutional continuity which is to some extent independent 
of the logic of control over political power. 
It should be emphasized that the primary aim of using these 
historical examples is not to make a historical point about the nature 
 14.  On the Federal Court see Rohit De, Emasculating the Executive: The 
Federal Court and Civil Liberties in Late Colonial India, in THE LEGAL COMPLEX 
IN POSTCOLONIAL STRUGGLES FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM 27-30 (Terrence C. 
Halliday et al. eds., 2012) (highlighting how the Federal Court over-ruled curbs on 
civil liberties under the Defence of India Rules, 1939) [hereinafter De, 
Emasculating the Executive]. On the Indian Civil Service, see POTTER, supra note 
8, at 50-56. 
 15.  See De, Emasculating the Executive, supra note 14, at 27-30 (highlighting 
how the Federal Court supported civil liberties during wartime, through 
invalidating government regulations on preventive detention, not allowing special 
criminal courts, and reading down the law of sedition in order to restrict its 
application); POTTER, supra note 8, at 2. 
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of colonial rule, but rather to make a conceptual point about the best 
ways of describing that rule, at least in the late-colonial period. The 
claim is that the category “colonial” is not always a helpful term 
through which to do so, particularly when applied to laws and 
institutions. In questioning the importance of this category and 
thereby undermining the colonial versus nationalist binary, this 
article makes a contribution to what Arvind Elangovan has described 
as the task of providing a non-nationalist understanding of Indian 
constitutional history.16 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION VERSUS 
EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT: THE 
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935 
Maurice Duverger draws a helpful distinction between conflict 
“within a regime” as opposed to conflict “about a regime.”17 Both 
sorts of conflict are evident in the debates around the Government of 
India Act, 1935.18 But while the overall arc of the nationalist reading 
of pre-1947 history emphasizses conflict about the regime, this frame 
does not sit well with the experience of the elected Congress 
Ministries in 1935-37. This section describes some elements of 
constitutional history that are better seen as instances of conflict – or 
perhaps even cooperation – within the regime. 
The regime in question was the result of a long period of 
constitutional reform and review starting with what came to be called 
the “Simon Commission” Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms 
and culminating with a period of revision and adaption of the 
existing laws of British India to bring them into conformity with the 
new Constitution.19 The Constitutional framework of the India Act 
 16.  Arvind Elangovan, The Making of the Indian Constitution: A Case for a 
Non-nationalist Approach, 12 HISTORY COMPASS, 1-10 (2014). Thanks to Rohit 
De for emphasizing the importance of restricting the argument of this article to the 
late-colonial state. In De, Emasculating the Executive, supra note 14, at 74, De 
also claims that “the judges and decisions of the Federal Court challenge any neat 
categorization into the nationalist/colonial binary.” 
 17.  See MAURICE DUVERGER, THE IDEA OF POLITICS: THE USES OF POWER IN 
SOCIETY (1966). Thank you to Professor Andre Beteille for drawing attention to 
this work. 
    18     See The Government of India Act, 1935, 26 Geo. 5, c. 2 (U.K.). 
 19.  INDIAN STATUTORY COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE INDIAN STATUTORY 
COMMISSION xii (1930) (stating the purpose of the Commission is to inquire into 
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divided legislative powers into federal, provincial and concurrent 
lists (a scheme which survives in the present Indian constitution).20 
The federal lists included subjects such as defense, external affairs, 
currency, and customs, while the Provinces were to legislate on 
topics such as public order, public health, education, agriculture and 
excise; the concurrent legislative list dealt with issues such as 
criminal law and procedure, censorship, bankruptcy, and labor.21 
Governors of the Provinces and the Governor-General at the 
Centre were advised by Ministries chosen from legislatures elected 
on the basis of a restricted franchise, with seats reserved for different 
communities.22 But Ministerial control at both levels were hedged in 
with a number of caveats.23 In the Centre, the Governor-General 
retained discretionary power over defense and external affairs and 
did not have to consult his ministers on these subjects.24 
In addition there were a number of areas for which he had a 
“special responsibility”25 and in respect of which he had the right to 
exercise his “individual judgment.”26 Amongst these “special 
responsibilities” were the prevention of “grave menace to the peace 
the working system of government, growth of education, and the development of 
representative institutions). See Arvind Elangovan, Provincial Autonomy, Sir 
Benegal Narsing Rau and an Improbable Imagination of Constitutionalism in 
India, 1935-38 in 36 COMP. STUD. S. ASIA AFR. & MIDDLE E. 66-82 (2016) for an 
account of the process of adapting the laws of British India to bring them in line 
with the 1935 Act. B. N. Rau, who played an important part in this process, went 
on to become the Adviser to the Constituent Assembly, where he played a crucial 
role in drafting the Constitution of independent India. See id. 
 20.  See The Government of India Act, 1935. For the complaint that the 
present-day constitution borrowed too much from the 1935 Act, see De, 
Constitutional Antecedents, supra note 5. 
 21.  See De, Constitutional Antecedents, supra note 5, at 303-08; KEITH B. 
ARTHUR, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF INDIA 1600-1935 (1936); REGINALD 
COUPLAND, THE INDIAN PROBLEM: REPORT ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM IN 
INDIA 143, 151 (1944). 
 22.  See 1935 Government of Indian Act, supra note 20, at 247 (stating each 
territorial constituency had an electoral roll which listed who could vote, based 
partly on their age, competency, ethnic, and religious background). 
 23.  See id. at 8. 
 24.  See id. (noting that while the Governor-General had authority in regards to 
defence and external affairs, he did not have discretionary power when it came to 
matters regarding the Federation and the Majesty’s dominions).  
 25.  Id. at 8-9. 
 26.  Id. at 9. 
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or tranquility of India,”27 the “safeguarding of legitimate minority 
interests,”28 and the “safeguarding of financial stability or credit.”29 
In these areas he was to consult his Ministers, but was not bound to 
act upon their advice.30 The Act also circumscribed the powers of the 
legislatures in terms of the subjects over which they could make 
laws: for instance, the federal legislature was not allowed to vote on 
matters concerning federal revenues, including the salaries of the 
Governor-General, or on expenditure on defensce and external 
affairs. Similar restrictions applied to the Provinces.31 
The 1935 Act was treated by a great deal of skepticism from a 
range of nationalist Indian opinion. Sir C. Y. Chintamani, a moderate 
liberal, wrote of it as an “anti-India Act;” Congress leaders were 
more forthright in calling it a “slave constitution” and a “charter of 
bondage.”32 In a pamphlet on the Constitution, Kunwar Muhammad 
Ashraf, a member of the Congress and later of the Communist Party, 
wrote “. . . it is obvious that the New Constitution does not in any 
way affect the basic political relationship between India and Great 
Britain.”33 The keystone of the imperialist domination of the country 
is to remain intact and India is to continue, as a subject country, to be 
ruled and exploited by an alien imperialist Government.”34 
Despite these criticisms, the Congress chose to contest the 1937 
elections and then to form ministries after forming absolute 
majorities in five out of eleven provinces (Madras, Bihar, Orissa, 
 27.  1935 Government of Indian Act, supra note 20, at 8.  
 28.  Id. at 9. 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  See id. at 8 (claiming that the Governor General had control over the 
minister’s salaries and the conditions of their service).  
 31.  See id. at 35 (emphasizing the executive authority for each province is only 
allowed to impact the areas of society which the Legislature of the Province has 
power to affect).  
 32.  W.H. MORRIS-JONES, PARLIAMENT IN INDIA 61 (1957). 
 33.  Z.A. Ahmad, Congress Political and Economic Studies-No. I: A Brief 
Analysis of the New Constitution 3 (1937), quoted in Arvind Elangovan, Provincial 
Autonomy, Sir Benegal Narsing Rau and an Improbable Imagination of 
Constitutionalism in India, 1935-38I, 36 COMP. STUD. S. ASIA AFR. & MIDDLE E. 
66, 66-82 (2016). 
 34.  Arvind Elangovan, Provincial Autonomy, Sir Benegal Narsing Rau and an 
Improbable Imagination of Constitutionalism in India, 1935-38, 36 COMP. STUD. 
S. ASIA AFR. & MIDDLE E. 66, 66-82 (2016) (describing the nationalist opposition 
to the Act, only the Muslim League was cautiously optimistic about its prospects). 
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Central Provinces, and UP) and a near majority in Bombay.35 These 
Ministries were to stay in office for two years, until they resigned en 
masse in October 1939 to protest the Viceroy’s unilateral decision to 
associate India with the Allied war against Germany.36 In these two 
years, as Sumit Sarkar puts it, “over the major part of the country, the 
persecuted of yesterday had become ministers, the new assemblies 
met to the strains of the Bande Mataram, and the national flag for 
which so many had faced lathis and bullets flew proudly over public 
buildings.”37 
But Sarkar also points out the “paradoxical” nature of this choice 
to participate in the 1935 Act – a paradox which prefigures the later 
paradox of colonial continuity: 
[a] party committed to Purna Swaraj and bitterly critical of the 1935 
Constitution working within its framework, with powers limited by 
official reservations and safeguards as well as by restricted financial 
resources, and having to implement decisions through a civil service and a 
police with which its relations had so long been extremely hostile.38 
While the Congress had initially decided to take charge of 
Provincial Ministries in order to obstruct the working of the Act 
“from within,” in fact, even skeptical British observers were 
surprised at the legislative and administrative record of the Congress 
ministries.39 Amongst the first acts of the Congress ministries was to 
release political prisoners,40 cancel orders curbing civil liberties 
under repressive legislation,41 and in some cases to repeal such 
legislation altogether – for instance the special Emergency Powers 
Act of 1932 in Bombay42 and the Public Safety Act of 1930 in Bihar 
and Orissa.43 
A number of Provinces also passed legislation on agrarian and 
other social issues. For instance, in 1938 the Provincial Ministry of 
 35.  SUMIT SARKAR, MODERN INDIA 1885-1887 349 (1983) [hereinafter 
SARKAR, MODERN]. 
 36.  See id. 
 37.  See id. at 351. 
 38.  See id. at 351. 
 39.  See MORRIS-JONES, supra note 32, at 65-67. 
 40.  See SARKAR, MODERN, supra note 35, at 352. 
 41.  See id. 
 42.  Act No. 9, Acts of Parliament, 1933 (India). 
 43.  COUPLAND, supra note 21, at 116.  
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Orissa passed, inter alia, the Orissa Co-operative Land Mortgage 
Bank Act,44 the Orissa Small Holders Relief Act,45 and the Orissa 
Nurse and Midwives Registration Act.46 In the same year, the Bihar 
legislature passed the Bihar Money-lenders (Amendment) Act, the 
Bihar Prohibition Act, and the Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Act.47 
Were the executive acts of these Ministries and the legislation 
passed by the Provincial Assemblies “colonial”? They were certainly 
colonial-era acts. But they were, after all, the constitutional actions 
of elected members of a political party that saw itself leading the 
extra-constitutional nationalist agitation against British rule. Yet the 
constitutional framework within which they operated was one which 
many observers thought had been designed to perpetuate colonial 
rule, not to end it.48 
If the term “colonial” is used not just to designate a historical 
period, but also to designate some particular aspect of that period 
(defined, for instance, by an opposition to the anti-colonial 
movement), then it is not easy to describe the working of the Act as 
either colonial or anti-colonial. And if the identification of these Acts 
as colonial is problematic, then their identification post-
Independence as colonial continuities is surely problematic as well. 
What are we to make of the fact that, say, the Bihar Prohibition Act 
continued in operation beyond 1947? Is it an example of a “colonial 
continuity”? This question does not seem to have a straightforward 
 44.  See Orissa Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Act, 1938, No. 3, Orissa 
Acts, 1938 (India) (granting long terms loans to landowners for a variety of 
individualized purposes, including agricultural improvements).  
 45.  See Orissa Small Holders Relief Act, 1938, No. 5, Orissa Acts, 1938 
(India) (rendering temporary debt relief to individual landowners who use their 
land for agriculture).  
 46.  See Orissa Nurses and Midwives Registration Act, 1938, No. 7, Orissa 
Acts, 1938 (India) (rendering better training to nurses, midwives, and health 
visitors). 
 47.  MATHA SHRU, THE BIHAR MONEY-LENDERS ACT: BEING BIHAR ACTS III 
OF 1938 & VII OF 1939 (1965); THE BIHAR PROHIBITION ACT, 1938 (BIHAR ACT VI 
OF 1938); THE BIHAR AGRICULTURAL INCOME-TAX ACT, 1938. 
 48.  This was, for instance, the view of Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, who 
thought the Act was the best way to maintain British influence in India: “It is no 
part of our policy, I take it . . . gratuitously to hurry the handing over the controls 
to Indian hands at any pace faster that that which we regard as best calculated, on a 
long view, to hold India to the Empire.” See SARKAR, MODERN, supra note 35, at 
338.  
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answer: there are interesting jurisprudential and constitutional 
questions in the neighborhood, but these tend not to be the questions 
of interest to those who raise the question of colonial continuities as 
either paradox or lament. 
Turning to the issue of conflict versus cooperation, consider the 
relation between the Congress Ministries and two arms of the 
colonial state which were clearly associated with the maintenance of 
the British Raj: the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and the police. The 
ICS had played an important role in the suppression of the civil 
disobedience movements of 1930 to 1933.49 ICS officers were at the 
forefront of formulating Government policy against the movement 
and advocated a much harsher response to it than either the Viceroy 
or the Secretary of State.50 They played an important role in directing 
the suppression of the movement on the ground.51 They had great 
discretionary powers, as well as civilian control over the police, 
which was accused of several excesses during this period.52 And 
much of their work consisted in specifically political activity directed 
against the Congress. 
The anti-Congress aspect of this activity was great enough to make 
the Governor of the United Provinces, Harry Haig, worry in 1932 of 
“the dangers in a development which would link official activities 
too closely with a political anti-Congress party of the future . . . . If 
in the politics of the new constitution . . . . officials are regarded as 
definitely anti-Congress, we cannot be surprised if Congress are very 
 49.  For more on the ICS role during the civil disobedience movement, see D. 
A. Low, “Civil martial law”: the Government of India and the Civil Disobedience 
Movements 1930-34 in CONGRESS AND THE RAJ, supra note 12. See also T.H. 
Beaglehole, From Rulers to Servants: The I.C.S. and the British Demission of 
Power in India, 11 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 237, 252 (1977) (maintaining a policy 
whereby an organization which poses a threat through violent rhetoric or a desire 
to break the law were targeted for dissolution). 
 50.  See Arudra Burra, The ICS and the Raj: 1919–50 (2007) (unpublished 
monograph) (on file with author); Arudra Burra, The Indian Civil Service and the 
nationalist movement: neutrality, politics and continuity, 48 COMMONWEALTH & 
COMP. POL. 404-32 (2010). 
 51.  See id. 
 52.  Lord Willingdon, the Viceroy, was unsympathetic: “Most of our officials 
have had a pretty rough time from the Congress party in the last two or three years 
and it may be that in some cases they are getting some of their own back.” See 
Low supra note 49, at 225-58. 
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definitely anti-official.”53 Fears about the “anti-official” possibilities 
of Congress rule under the Government of India Act, 1935 led to a 
demand from the services for constitutional safeguards to protect 
themselves from possible victimization by Congress Ministries.54 
These demands were successful, leading to an unprecedented level of 
constitutional protection for the rights of civil servants,55 which 
themselves aroused a great deal of nationalist resentment.56 
And yet, on the whole, relations between the services and the 
Ministries were cordial, a fact acknowledged by even so skeptical a 
commentator as Coupland.57  Consider the example of the Congress 
Ministry in Madras under the Premiership of C. Rajagopalachari 
(also known as Rajaji), later Minister of Home Affairs in 
independent India. As Potter puts it, the working of the Act did not 
suggest a complete transfer of power from the ICS to the Indian 
ministers: while the ICS secretaries had a great deal of say over 
minor matters of policy with respect to their generally more 
inexperienced Ministers, in major policy matters Rajaji had the final 
say.58 But here, according to one ICS officer, he tended to side with 
his ICS Secretaries rather than his Ministerial colleagues, saying that 
he had much more confidence in the former than in the latter.59 
David Arnold paints a similar picture with respect to the situation 
of the Indian Police Service in Madras was similar.60 The police had 
been on the front lines of colonial repression of nationalist agitation, 
who were “castigated and condemned for their violent and ‘arbitrary’ 
conduct,” and in the years leading up to the adoption of the new 
Constitution, they too had expressed concern over possible 
victimization and had secured some safeguards under the Act.61 But 
these concerns proved unwarranted, for in Rajagopalachari they 
 53.  Beaglehole, supra note 49, at 254.   
 54.  See id. at 251 (claiming that there was a belief that areas of administration 
may be handed over to the Ministries at a later point in time than the transfer of 
political authority).  
 55.  See id. at 254-55. 
 56.  See id. at 254-55. 
 57.  E.g., Burra, Cobwebs, supra note 11, at 79-80. See also COUPLAND, supra 
note 21, at 118-20. 
 58.  POTTER, supra note 8, at 48-49. 
 59.  See ARNOLD, supra note 8, at 216-17.  
 60.  See id. at 185. 
 61.  See id. at 212. 
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found a protector rather than an opponent: in his first Budget in 1937 
he asked that the police grant be passed without dissent, requesting 
that no “harsh language” be employed towards the Police in the 
process.62 In his second Budget speech, in March 1938, he urged 
MLAs to try to understand those who performed “the most difficult 
and the most unappreciated part” of the work of government, and 
urged them and the public to put aside past “prejudices” against the 
police.63 
This attitude did not endear Rajagopalachari to some of his 
Congress colleagues, who regretted that those “who were hitherto 
speaking the language of independence and struggle have begun to 
speak the language of ‘Law and Order’ of the old regime.”64 This 
“law and order” mentality was particularly evident in matters 
concerning labor unrest, in which the administration sided with the 
employers (Rajaji was notable for his anti-communist views).65 
Called by the all-India Congress leadership to defend themselves 
against charges of “repression” following police violence against 
strikers in 1938, the Minister of Information claimed that the 
Government had followed the “normal procedure that has to be 
followed by any Government charged with the maintenance of law 
and order.”66 
Indeed, this resemblance to the old regime was evident in other 
areas as well.67 In 1937 Rajagopalachari ordered a prosecution for 
seditious speeches under the Press Act of 1931,68 which had been 
formulated by the British Government for use against the civil 
disobedience movement.69 He used the Criminal Procedure Code to 
forbid the opening of a factory during a strike,70 as well as the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act to clamp down on an agitation 
regarding the Government’s language policy.71 
 62.  See id. at 217. 
 63.  See id. 
 64.  See ARNOLD, supra note 8, at 213-14. 
 65.  See id. 
 66.  See id. at 223-25. 
 67.  For what follows, see Coupland’s somewhat gleeful account. See 
COUPLAND, supra note 21, at 133-34. 
 68.  See id. 
 69.  See id. 
 70.  See id. 
 71.  See id. 
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While Rajagopalachari’s attitude was not uncriticised within the 
Congress, it is clear that it had at least the tacit approval of the 
Party’s “high command.” Consider this remarkable resolution passed 
by the All-India Congress Committee in 1938: 
Inasmuch as people, including a few Congressmen, have been found in 
the name of civil liberty to advocate murder, arson, looting and class war 
by violent means, and several newspapers are carrying on a campaign of 
falsehood and violence calculated to incite the readers to violence and to 
lead to communal conflicts, the Congress warns the public that civil 
liberty does not cover acts of, or incitements to, violence or promulgation 
of palpable falsehoods. Inspite, therefore, of the Congress policy of civil 
liberty remaining unchanged, the Congress will, consistently with its 
tradition, support measures that may be undertaken by the Congress 
Governments for the defence of life and property.72 
Notice how much easier it is to talk of some of Rajagopalachari’s 
actions as “colonial,” though they had exactly the same constitutional 
status as, for instance, the act of releasing political prisoners 
elsewhere in India. Thus, as a term of constitutional art, the term 
“colonial” applies equally to the release of political prisoners on the 
one hand and to the prosecution for seditious speeches on the other. 
If the term “colonial” seems more easily applicable to prosecutions 
for sedition, then it is not being used in a purely descriptive sense, 
but  stands in for something more normatively loaded – a synonym 
for “authoritarian” or “oppressive,” perhaps. Notice, though, that 
authoritarian and oppressive regimes are not necessarily colonial in 
their origins. 
On the historical side, three points are worth emphasizing. First, 
despite an initial opposition to the Government of India Act, 1935, 
the story of the working of the elected Ministries was not one of 
continuous conflict with the Raj; indeed, elected Ministries had to 
depend upon the civil service and the police to carry out their own 
policies.73 The “Founding Fathers” who debated the shape of the new 
polity thus had some experience – not all of it negative – of the 
instruments of the old polity which they were eventually to retain.74 
 
 72.  See COUPLAND, supra note 21, at 134. 
 73.  See generally ARNOLD, supra note 8; POTTER, supra note 8. 
 74.  See generally ARNOLD, supra note 8; POTTER, supra note 8. 
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The point could be made more broadly. Austin points out, for 
instance, that Patel’s extensive experience with section 299 of the 
Government of India Act, 1935 (governing the acquisition of 
property for public purposes) played a crucial role in determining the 
eventual shape of the right to property in Article 31 of the 1950 
Constitution.75 In a similar vein, Morris-Jones points out an argument 
in favor of a Westminster-style Parliamentary system put forward by 
K. M. Munshi in the Constituent Assembly.76 One of his claims was 
that a Parliamentary system was better suited to Indian conditions, 
because Parliamentary traditions had by now become familiar.77 
Second, nationalist narratives of the framing of the Constitution 
tend to focus on the role of the Congress as an extra-constitutional 
anti-colonial movement; it is that history which is continuously 
referred to in the Constituent Assembly Debates.78 What this leaves 
out is the history of the Congress Party as a sometime constitutional 
holder of political power in the Provinces, both in the period 1937-
1939 as well as in 1946, when the Congress Ministries were re-
instated.79 There are some state interests – such as the maintenance 
of law and order – which are simply state interests, whether the state 
 75.  See GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A 
NATION 118-25 (1966). 
 76.  See MORRIS-JONES, supra note 32, at 87-88 (focusing on the stronger 
executive in the British system, as well as Indian familiarity with parliamentary 
democracy after a century of British rule).  
 77.  Id. (“For the last thirty or forty years some kind of responsibility has been 
introduced in the governance of this country. Our constitutional traditions have 
become parliamentary, and we have now all our provinces functioning more or less 
on the British model . . . . After this experience, why should we go back upon the 
tradition that has been built for over a hundred years and try a novel experiment 
framed 150 years ago and found wanting even in America?”). 
 78.  See AUSTIN, supra note 75, at 8-9; SARBANI SEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
INDIA: POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATIONS 27 (2007) 
(emphasizing the fact that the Assembly embodied Indian revolutionary principles 
and was not created by the British Parliament). 
 79.  It is likely that Congress’ role as the party in power during the 
deliberations of the Constituent Assembly played a significant, and as yet 
underexplored, role in the formation of the Constitution. Austin does recognize 
that the government formed the “third point” of a tight triangle (the other two 
being the Constituent Assembly and the Congress Party). See AUSTIN, supra note 
75, at 8-9. However, Austin says little about the fact that so many of the important 
figures in the Assembly also held positions in Nehru’s Cabinet. For a list of some 
of these figures and the positions they held see AUSTIN, supra note 75, at 19. 
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in question is a colonial or a post-colonial one.80 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, so long as one is in the 
business of exercising state power, one will have to rely on 
institutions such as the bureaucracy and the police. It is part of the 
nature of these institutions to be in some respects “neutral” with 
respect to politics, to serve their political masters irrespective of 
ideology, as long as one is functioning in a broadly constitutional 
framework.81 The post-Independence decision to retain many of the 
institutions of colonial rule, such as the bureaucracy, the police, and 
the army, had a great deal to do with their recognition of the fact that 
they were supposed to be, and thought themselves to be, in some 
sense loyal to the constitutional structure no matter who was in 
charge of it.82 
When questions about the persistence of colonial institutions are 
framed in terms of the puzzle of colonial continuity, one tends to 
leave out the fact that the institutions in questions were institutions. 
The fact that they were originally formed for the purposes of 
supporting colonial rule, and played a role in sustaining it, does not 
automatically disqualify them serving under an anti-colonial regime. 
This article revisits this point in Part III. 
 80.  The interesting question in India and elsewhere is why a post-colonial state 
would interpret “law and order” in the particularly repressive way reminiscent of 
the colonial power it replaced. Cf. DUVERGER, supra note 17, at 176. 
 81.  See STEPHEN P. COHEN, THE INDIAN ARMY: THE CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A NATION 1, 195 (1990) (“To officers (in the Indian Army at 
least) profession comes first, and ‘politics’ finds no place.”)  
 82.  See generally Arudra Burra, The Indian Civil Service and the Nationalist 
Movement: Neutrality, Politics, and Continuity, 48 COMMONWEALTH AND COMP. 
POL. 404, 405, 419 (2010) (quoting an officer in the army that said recruits who 
were politically active before joining were considered undesirable); COHEN, supra 
note 81, at 165-68 (discussing a similar point in connection with the Indian Army); 
Kalhan et al., supra note 2, at 111-12 (noting that, after independence, no 
significant changes were made to the way the police force functioned); B.B. 
MISRA, THE BUREAUCRACY IN INDIA: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF 
DEVELOPMENT UP TO 1947, 359 (1977) (arguing the merits of a separation between 
the government and the civil service). 
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III. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY WITHIN THE 
COLONIAL STATE 
In Part II, it was argued that the term “colonial” is difficult to 
apply in those periods of pre-1947 which were characterized by 
constitutional cooperation rather than extra-constitutional conflict. 
This section highlights another difficulty with the use of the term 
“colonial” in the pre-1947 era—the fact that the colonial state was 
not a unitary entity. There were disagreements between the 
Provincial Governments and the Government of India and between 
the Government of India and the Secretary of State. Similarly, there 
were disagreements between different organs of the State at 
particular points of time: for instance, between the executive and the 
judiciary. Even if these conflicts ended in favor of laws and policies 
which upheld the grip of British rule (and this was not always the 
case), it becomes harder, as an analytical matter, to identify as 
“colonial” one or the other of these sides in the debate. The point is 
illustrated with reference to two institutions: the Indian Civil Service 
(ICS) and the Federal Court of India. 
A. THE ICS AND SECRET GOVERNMENT FILES 
The ICS example relates to a question which arose in connection 
with the introduction of provincial autonomy under the Government 
of India Act, 1935, shortly before it was implemented: what was the 
Government to do with confidential secretariat records, which, under 
the new Constitution, would now be available to Indian politicians? 
These records were, after all, concerned with “the policy of the 
present Government with political movements of a subversive 
character, such as civil disobedience movements.”83 It was the 
leaders of these “subversive” political movements who might now 
come to power under the new Act. The question of what to do with 
these record was discussed at length over the course of six months 
starting in December 1934. 
The file begins with a note from the Government of Bombay to the 
Government of India, in which it is suggested that the records be 
transferred to the custody of the Governor of the respective 
 83.  POTTER, supra note 8, at 50, n.79.  
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provinces: 
If such records remain in the Secretariat at the time of the introduction of 
the new constitution they will become the property of the new 
Government to be dealt with as it likes. Containing, as they do, much 
highly confidential correspondence between the Secretary of State, the 
Government of India and the provincial Government, it can hardly be 
contemplated that they should be left in a position where they might fall 
into the hands of Indian politicians. Apart from this danger, however, I am 
to point out that in the past all officers have dealt freely with political 
questions on the assumption that what they wrote was for the use only of 
the Governor in Council in a reserved department, and it would be a 
breach of the confidence of those officers, especially Indians, to place 
these records at the disposal of the provincial Government which they will 
in future have to serve.84 
The Bombay position was in a minority, with only the Madras 
government agreeing with its position.85 The Governments of Assam, 
Central Provinces, Bengal, Punjab, Bihar, Orissa, United Provinces, 
and the North-West Frontier Province all disagreed, more or less 
vehemently.86 Thus the Government of Central Provinces argued that 
access to these files was necessary for administrative continuity and 
efficiency, and that denying this access would imperil “the proper 
development of the new Constitution.”87 This was also the position 
of Assam and the North-West Frontier Province: while there was a 
risk if future Ministers were given access to these records, the risk of 
denying them this access was greater, for it would lead to “a feeling 
of distrust,”88 and would “from the start be a source of justifiable 
grievance to the [incoming Ministers] and the general public . . . the 
new building required to house these secret records would be a 
perpetual monument of distrust.”89 
The Governments of Bihar and Orissa pointed out that self-
respecting Ministers would feel bound to resign if they found 
themselves “continuously hedged in when [they] required 
information about past decisions of Government.”90 And the 
 84.  Id. at 51. 
 85.  See id. at 51-53. 
 86.  See id. at 51-52. 
 87.  Id. at 51-52. 
 88.  POTTER, supra note 8, at 51. 
 89.  Id. at 52. 
 90.  Id. 
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Government of Punjab pointed out that “[a] minister must have 
access to all records of Government which will help to discharge his 
duties properly.”91 To deny ministers access to files concerning law 
and order at the same time as giving them the responsibility for 
preserving it, it felt, would not be “practical politics.”92 
There was, to be sure, a risk of “rousing the enmity”93 of 
“vindictive”94 ministers, though it suggested that such fears were 
overblown, for “[t]ime softens asperities, and a future minister who 
may chance to read a summary related to himself or his friends will 
view these documents with a perspective than if he had known of 
them at the time they were written.”95 The North-West Frontier 
Province concurred, thinking it “advisable in such matters to trust 
from the start in the ministers’ good sense, aided if necessary by their 
oath of office and the Official Secrets Act.”96 
The majority view prevailed in the Home Department, and a letter 
was sent to Bombay supporting this view, claiming that “[t]he British 
Government have agreed to the transfer of responsibility and it 
would hardly be consistent to refuse to make the records available to 
those to whom the responsibility is transferred.”97 The letter did, 
however, acknowledge the fears of the Bombay Government and 
suggested that certain kinds of records – for instance dossiers of 
revolutionaries and Congress workers and correspondence between 
very high officials dealing with prominent politicians – could be 
transferred to the offices of the provincial Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID), the Governor, or be destroyed.98 In the end a 
compromise was reached: while the general policy was to be that 
suggested by the various Provincial Governments, special exception 
might be made in the case of Bombay, where “probably possible 
measures against civil disobedience were discussed more freely than 
in other provinces where the movement was less intense” and there 
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Id. at 56. 
 93.  POTTER, supra note 8, at 52. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 53. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  See POTTER, supra note 8, at 53. 
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was thus perhaps a greater chance of reprisals.99 
B. THE FEDERAL COURT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
The case of the secret government files involved conflicts within a 
single colonial institution. Now consider a case of conflict between 
two colonial institutions, the Federal Court of India and the Political 
Executive, with respect to wartime provisions licensing preventive 
detention.100 In September 1939 the Government of India passed the 
“Defence of India” Ordinance, which was passed into law later that 
month, as an “Act to provide for special measures to ensure the 
public safety and interest and the defence of British India and for the 
trial of certain offences.”101 Section 2 of the Act gave the Central 
Government the power to make rules “necessary or expedient” for 
“securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the 
maintenance of public order or the efficient prosecution of the war, 
or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the 
community.”102 Section 2(2) elaborated that these rules could provide 
for, or empower any authority to make orders providing for, a 
number of matters, including: 
(x) the apprehension and detention in custody of any person reasonably 
suspected of being of hostile origin or of having acted, acting or being 
about to act, in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or interest or to 
the defence of British India . . .103 
Under Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules, the Central or 
Provincial Government could make an order directing the detention 
of a person if they were satisfied that it was necessary with a view to 
preventing him from “acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence 
 99.  See id. at 54 (noting how though within the Home Department there was 
disagreement on this point, with the Under Secretary suggesting that there was no 
need to make an exception for Bombay, despite disagreement on this point within 
the Home Department, since the situation the exception envisaged was extremely 
rare. In the end, the Home Secretary overruled the Under Secretary with the 
concurrence of the Home Member).  
 100.  See generally De, Emasculating the Executive, supra note 14, at 59, 62 
(describing this conflict in great detail). 
 101.  THE DEFENSE OF INDIA ACT (1939), reprinted in A COLLECTION OF THE 
ACTS OF THE INDIAN LEGISLATURE AND OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL FOR THE 
YEAR 1939 1, 1 (1939). 
 102.  Id. at 2. 
 103.  Id. at 4. 
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of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order, 
His Majesty’s relations with foreign powers or Indian States, the 
maintenance of peaceful conditions in tribal areas or the efficient 
prosecution of the war.”104 
In the case of Keshav Talpade, the Bombay High Court had 
refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus to secure the release of the 
petitioner, who had been arrested and detained under Rule 26 
following an order of the Bombay Government.105 He appealed to the 
Federal Court, claiming that the Defence of India Act was 
unconstitutional, because “it purported to relate to the defence of 
India,” while the Government of India Act, 1935 gave no powers to 
either the Central or Provincial Legislatures to legislate on this 
subject.106 
Even though the Court saw no merit in this Constitutional 
argument, it drew attention to a problem which the appellant had not 
himself noticed: that Rule 26 might itself not be within the rule-
making powers conferred by the Defence of India Act. The problem 
was that the Section 2(2)(x) of the Act made a provision for rules 
governing detention in cases of “reasonable suspicion,” while Rule 
26 required only the “satisfaction” of the Government. Accordingly, 
the Court felt itself “compelled” to ask two questions: 
(1) whether “reasonably suspected” in the rule-making power means 
suspected on grounds which appear reasonable for the detaining authority 
or whether it means suspected on grounds which are in fact reasonable; 
and 
(2) whether a statutory power to make a rule for the detention of persons 
reasonably suspected of having acted, of acting, or of being about to act in 
a certain specified way justifies the making of a rule which merely 
empowers Government to detain a person if it is satisfied that it is 
necessary to do so with a view to preventing him from acting in that way 
or in certain other ways also.107 
 104.  Keshav Talpade v. King Emperor, 30 A.I.R. 1943 Federal Court 1, ¶ 8. 
(“The references to His Majesty’s relations with foreign powers or Indian States 
and the maintenance of peaceful conditions in tribal areas were added to the 
original rule by Notification dated August 3, 1940.”) 
 105.  Id. at ¶ 1. 
 106.  Id. at ¶ 1. 
 107.  Id. at ¶ 8. 
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In considering these questions, the Court had in mind the recently 
delivered judgment of the House of Lords in Liversedge v. 
Anderson,108 which concerned the proper construction of a regulation 
made under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939. The 
regulation in question allowed the Secretary to order a person 
detained if he had “reasonable cause” to believe that person to have 
been involved in a variety of prejudicial activities.109 
In that case, the House of Lords had answered that the relevant 
standard of reasonableness was not an independent standard with 
respect to which the judgment of the Home Secretary could be 
examined by a Court; it only required him to satisfy himself that he 
had reasonable cause.110 But the Court’s reasoning proceeded from 
its view that such wide discretionary power had been given “to one 
who has high authority and grave responsibility”; “a Secretary of 
State, one of the high officers of State who, by reason of his position, 
is entitled to public confidence in his capacity and integrity, who is 
answerable to Parliament for his conduct in office and who has 
access to exclusive sources of information.”111 
The Court in Talpade pointed out that the Indian Act did not 
specify who had the authority to issue such orders.112 Given that the 
numbers of orders issued was very large, it was unlikely that they 
would have had the personal attention of the Governor-General-in-
Council or the Governors with their advisers; the decisions would 
have to be made by officials, who need not be highly placed. In such 
circumstances, the Court said, “it would certainly seem that the more 
natural construction of the words of paragraph (x) is that there must 
be suspicions which are reasonable in fact and not merely suspicions 
which some as yet unspecified person or authority might regard as 
reasonable.”113 
However, the main grounds upon which the Court struck down 
Rule 26 was simply that the “satisfaction” standard of the Rule was 
broader than the “reasonable suspicion” standard of section  2(2)(x): 
 108.  Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson [1942] A.C. 206.  
 109.  Keshav Talpade v. King Emperor, 30 A.I.R. 1943 Federal Court 1, ¶ 10. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at ¶ 11 (noting that the authority should be dependent on each 
individual rule, and decided by the executive making the rules). 
 113.  Id. at ¶ 13. 
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The rule would enable the Central Government or any Provincial 
Government to detain a person about whom it need have no suspicions, 
reasonable or unreasonable, that he has acted, is acting, or is about to act 
in any prejudicial manner at all. The Government has only to be satisfied 
that with a view to preventing him from acting in a particular way it is 
necessary to detain him. The Government may come to the conclusion 
that it would be wiser to take no risks, and may therefore subject a person 
to preventive detention against whom there is no evidence or reasonable 
suspicion of past or present prejudicial acts, or of any actual intention of 
acting prejudicially; and Rule 26 gives it power to do so.114 
The Court also voiced a concern about the fact that the order of the 
Government of Bombay merely “mechanically” repeated the 
language of Rule 26 in citing the grounds upon which Keshav 
Talpade had been detained;115 this did nothing “to remove the 
apprehension we have already expressed that in many cases the 
persons in whom this grave power is vested may have had no 
opportunity of applying their minds to the facts of every case which 
come before them.”116 It concluded: 
We recognize that our decision may be a cause of inconvenience and 
possibly of embarrassment, even though temporarily, to the executive 
authority. We regret that this should be so, especially in these difficult 
times; but we venture to express an earnest hope that greater care may be 
taken hereafter to secure that powers of this extraordinary kind which may 
affect, and indeed have affected, the liberty of so many of the King’s 
subjects in India, may be defined with greater precision and exactitude, so 
as to reduce to as small a compass as possible the risk that persons may 
find themselves apprehended and detained without legal warrant.117 
As Rohit De points out, the decision alarmed the Viceroy, because 
all 8,000 detainees under Rule 26 now might be able to launch 
habeas challenges against their detention.118 He promulgated an 
ordinance, given retrospective effect, to revalidate all orders under 
Rule 26 which might have become vulnerable after the Talpade 
case.119 This ordinance was in turn challenged in several High 
 114.  Keshav Talpade v. King Emperor, 30 A.I.R. 1943 Federal Court 1, ¶ 14. 
 115.  Id. at ¶ 16. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at ¶ 18. 
 118.  See De, Emasculating the Executive, supra note 14, at 59, 64. 
 119.  Compare THE DEFENSE OF INDIA ACT (1939), reprinted in A COLLECTION 
OF THE ACTS OF THE INDIAN LEGISLATURE AND OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL FOR 
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Courts, and was overturned by the Calcutta High Court,120 though it 
was upheld in the High Courts of Allahabad, Lahore, and Madras.121 
On appeal to the Federal Court, the ordinance was held to be 
valid.122 But the Federal Court also ordered the release of all 
appellants on the grounds that under Rule 26 the provincial 
government should have applied its mind to each individual case to 
become satisfied that there were grounds for detention.123 The Court 
claimed further that this task required the personal satisfaction of the 
Governor and could not be delegated.124 Since the requirements of 
Rule 26 had been so grossly violated, the Court noted that it would 
not be safe to presume that the thousands of detentions already made 
under this Rule were valid.125 
De points out that these decisions generated a great deal of 
publicity, even though the released detainees were then arrested on 
other grounds:126 Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar was arrested within the 
Court premises itself under Regulation III of 1818, minutes after the 
Court had set him free from detention under Rule 26.127 This in turn 
prompted the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court to threaten the 
Chief Secretary of Bengal and the superintendent of police with 
committing contempt of court.128 
THE YEAR 1939 1, 4 (1939) (providing the original textual language), with Shib 
Nath Banerjee And Ors. vs A.E. Porter, 1943 A.I.R. (Cal.) 377, ¶¶ 2-3(India) 
(substituting the aforementioned language from the Defense of India Act with: “the 
apprehension and detention in custody of any person whom the authority 
empowered by the rules to apprehend or detain as the case may be suspects, on 
grounds, appearing to such authority to be reasonable.” Additionally noting that 
the Ordinance further clarified: “For the removal of doubts it is hereby enacted that 
no order heretofore made against any person under Rule 26 of the Defence of India 
Rules shall be deemed to be invalid or shall be called in question on the ground 
merely that the said rule purported to confer powers in excess of the powers that 
might at the time the said rule was made be lawfully conferred by a rule made or 
deemed to have been made under Section 2, Defence of India Act, 1939”).  
 120.  Shib Nath Banerjee, 1943 A.I.R. at ¶ 9. 
 121.  Id. at ¶ 23. 
 122.  Emperor v. Shibnath Banerjee, 1943 A.I.R. Federal Court 75. 
 123.  Shib Nath Banerjee, 1943 A.I.R. at ¶ 69. 
 124.  Id. at ¶ 116. 
 125.  Shib Nath Banerjee And Ors. vs A.E. Porter, 1943 A.I.R. (Cal.) 377, ¶ 116 
(India). 
 126.  See De, Emasculating the Executive, supra note 14, at 70. 
 127.  See id. 
 128.  See generally id. at 70-72 (describing the context in which being held in 
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The fear of the Calcutta High Court holding civil servants in 
contempt prompted the Viceroy to ask the Secretary of State in 
London for a grant of special powers of pardon in such cases;129 this 
was deemed impossible because the Royal Prerogative to issue 
pardons did not cover the offense of contempt and hence could not 
be delegated.130 Eventually the Governor of Bengal was informed 
that he had to exercise his individual judgment with respect to each 
security prisoner in Bengal – some 1,700 in all over the course of six 
months.131 
C. CONCLUSION 
The point of these examples is not to make a claim about the 
extent to which different organs of the colonial state were liberal or 
anti-colonial. It was already pointed out that the ICS, for instance, 
played an important role in the suppression of the nationalist 
agitations, both in terms of policy and on the ground; their role was 
very much in the nature of protecting the Raj when it was under 
threat. The ICS resisted the grant of Provincial Autonomy and 
worked in some instances against Congress in the elections after the 
1935 Act.132 
Similarly, De points out that the High Courts in India were not 
known for their willingness to defend the rule of law when it was 
under attack from the colonial state, most dramatically in the trial of 
Bhagat Singh in the previous decade.133 Nor were the judges of the 
contempt of court was a serious concern for particular members of the 
government). 
 129.  Id. at 71. 
 130.  Id. (“There was real fear that the Calcutta High Court might find senior 
civil servants in contempt of court. For example, in 1943 a panicked viceroy wrote 
to London asking for special letters patent to grant him power of pardon over 
contempt cases. There was a flurry of anxious correspondence when it was 
discovered that the Royal Prerogative in England did not cover pardon for offenses 
of contempt; therefore it was impossible for the king to delegate such powers to the 
viceroy through letters patent.”). 
 131.  See id. at 72 (specifying an influx of 393 of these cases between July 5-12, 
1973 and an additional influx of over 1,300 cases in the six months thereafter). 
 132.  See POTTER, supra note 8, at 50-51 (describing one of the most difficult 
issues facing the ICS under the 1935 Act: what to do with secret political records). 
 133.  De, Emasculating the Executive, supra note 14, at 67-68 (using the Bhagat 
Singh case to highlight the Indian courts greater failure to address rule of law 
violations in the preceding decade, and noting the generally unprecedented nature 
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Federal Court known for their nationalist sympathies – Chief Justice 
Gwyer had been the main draughtsman of the Government of India 
Act, 1935 and his successor, Patrick Spens, was a Conservative MP; 
neither could the Indian judges of the Court be seen as anti-
imperialists in waiting. 
So the claim is not that these instances are representative of 
colonial rule during this period. Rather, the lessons to draw  are  
methodological and conceptual. There are three methodological 
points in all. First, the location of an institution as part of the overall 
colonial state does not automatically dictate what decisions are to be 
taken in particular cases. As David Potter writes in the ICS context 
“[p]olicy making within the raj was rarely a simple and 
straightforward undertaking. Frequently there was uncertainty in the 
minds of the ICS men as to how best to serve imperial interests when 
making policy choices.”134 Just as the governments of the different 
Provinces could disagree about what to do with secret files, the High 
Courts of British India did not function with one mind; one sees this 
for instance in the fact that only the Calcutta High Court struck down 
the Viceroy’s ordinance after the first Federal Court ruling.135 
The second point is that different organs or institutions of the 
colonial state could disagree with one another. The division between 
the judiciary and the executive in the Talpade case is a stark 
example; but frequently even the ICS, the Government of India 
under the Viceroy, and the Secretary of State in London did not see 
eye to eye on matters of policy or practice.136 Within the ICS, for 
instance, there had been great resistance to the Government of India 
Act, 1935; pressure for Provincial Autonomy came from the imperial 
power in London.137 
It is worth pointing out that sometimes the institutional and 
political alignments could go in the other direction as well. For 
of judicial challenges to decisions of the executive branch). 
 134.  See POTTER, supra note 8, at 55. 
 135.  See id. at 46 (describing how having connections in the court was seen as 
beneficial in the outcome of the matter, such that it would be difficult for the courts 
to function as one entity). 
 136.  See generally id. at  44-46 (describing how the ICS members in the 
secretariats, and various executive heads, shared the policy-making powers, which 
may contribute to internal divisions in the overall Government of India). 
 137.  See POTTER, supra note 8. 
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instance, after the Quit India agitation of 1942, there was a heated 
debate within the Government of India about a proposed policy of 
“economic warfare” against the Congress and its supporters.138 Could 
the government cancel licenses of “known supporters” of the 
Congress? Sir Richard Tottenham, the Additional Secretary in the 
Home Department at the Central Government, and Sir Reginald 
Maxwell, the Home Member in the Executive Council argued that it 
should, in the course of a spirited debate which lasted a little over a 
year.139 But the policy was defeated because of sustained hostility 
from many provincial governments, sometimes from ICS Chief 
Secretaries and heads of other government departments, and at other 
times from their Governors.140 
A third set of examples might be drawn simply from the Appeals 
process within the judicial system. To take just one example, in the 
case of Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. King-Emperor (1942),141 Chief 
Justice Maurice Gwyer of the Federal Court of India read down the 
sedition statute (section 124A of the Indian Penal Code) to apply 
only to speech which could lead to public disorder; this was a 
departure from the interpretation in Tilak’s case (1897), in which 
Justice Strachey of the Bombay High Court argued that the offense 
essentially involved the exciting of bad feelings towards the 
Government, whether or not the bad feelings led to any public 
disorder.142 Justice Gwyer’s interpretation was in turn challenged in 
the case of King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao,143 and 
overturned by the Privy Council, which reinstated Justice Strachey’s 
interpretation of the sedition statute.144 
 138.  See Indian Civil Service, supra note 81, at 408. 
 139.  Id. at 409. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1939 (Cal.) 703 (India). 
 142.  Id. See The Indian Penal Code, No. 45 of 1860, INDIA CODE (1993), vol. 1  
(“Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible 
representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or 
excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the Government established by 
law in India, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, to which fine may be 
added, or with imprisonment which may extend to three years, to which fine may 
be added, or with fine”); Queen-Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1897) ILR 22, 
112 (India). 
 143.  King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, 1944 A.I.R. 46 (Bom.) 459 
(India). 
 144.  See Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, (1962) 955 A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 
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Both the Federal Court and the Privy Council were colonial 
institutions and so in one well-defined sense their decisions were 
“colonial decisions.” But their status as colonial decisions in this 
sense does not entail that they were directed at the project of 
maintaining colonial rule, though of course both institutions 
functioned in a context which took that rule for granted. Conversely, 
if we identify the term “colonial” with decisions, laws, and 
institutions which were specifically directed at the maintenance of 
colonial rule, then we are forced into the uncomfortable position of 
saying that there were aspects of the late-colonial state which were 
not “colonial” in this sense. 
The third point is the most important. Once we recognize that the 
colonial state consisted of different institutions whose interests did 
not always converge, we should also recognize that part of the 
decision-making within these institutions is clearly institutional. In 
the ICS case, for instance, Potter writes: 
The coming of such ministries was hardly regarded with delight by senior 
ICS men, for they seemed to represent a threat to their own position; but 
that narrower interest had to give way to the general policy guideline of 
the state. If the state ruled that the ICS should commit decorous suicide, 
then that is what the ICS would do. For they were, above all, civil 
servants working under general direction from above. The existence of 
this broad constraint on policy making helps to explain why senior ICS 
men in most provinces had by the mid-1930s a rather more positive 
attitude towards the impending constitutional changes and increased 
democratization than one might have expected.145 
Rohit De makes a similar point with respect to the Federal Court: 
For law to function as ideology in colonial India, there were moments 
when the rhetoric of the rule of law was forced to become a reality. The 
courts did not, and could not, challenge the fact that the state of 
emergency was required. Neither did they question the ideas of preventive 
detention, executive discretion or the exercise of arbitrary powers. What 
they objected to the absence of any guidelines to regulate this discretion 
and the attempts to exclude judicial review. Justice Zafrullah Khan, 
declaring the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance void, held that “a 
legislation even though it be an emergency legislation must bear the 
(India) (reasserting Justice Gwyer’s interpretation of section 124A, in response to a 
constitutional free speech challenge). 
 145.  POTTER, supra note 8, at 55-56. 
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stamp of legislation.” Justice Varachariar labeled the emergency 
ordinances as “press-the-button” legislation where there had been little 
application of mind. The legislation was invalidated not on any abstract 
conception of fundamental rights but on the failure to conform to the 
basic principles of administrative law.146 
The point is that, even in a colonial context, institutions might 
function on the basis of norms and values which, on occasion, might 
go against their own interests (the ICS case), or against the broader 
colonial interest (the Talpade case); they may in that limited sense be 
autonomous from the broader colonial project. 
These three points are once again reasons to treat the conceptual 
category of the “colonial” with some suspicion. A decision to 
prevent elected officials from access to secret files, or an ordinance 
to facilitate preventive detention, are what comes to mind when one 
uses the term “colonial” in a post-colonial context. And it is these 
sorts of decisions which prompt scholars to study the continuities 
between, say, colonial and postcolonial security laws.147 But if there 
is room within the colonial context both for the destruction of these 
files as well as for their preservation, or for the formulation of 
preventive detention ordinance as well as for its striking down, then 
perhaps the term “colonial” does not do justice to the historical 
particularities of this rule.148 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Anxieties about colonial continuities into the post-colonial 
situation are at least as old as the post-colonial situation itself. They 
were expressed vividly in the Constituent Assembly Debates by 
members who thought that it was a mistake to model the Constitution 
on the Government of India Act, 1935, for instance in the much-
quoted lament by K. Hanumanthaiya that “[w]e wanted the music of 
Veena or Sitar, but here we have the music of an English band.”149 
 146.  De, Emasculating the Executive, supra note 14, at 81. 
 147.  See Kalhan et al., supra note 2, at 125-26 (contextualizing the interest of 
security laws for scholars). 
 148.  Again, none of this is intended by any means as a defense of colonial rule, 
in the British or any other context. It is a plea for analytic clarity when deciding 
just what aspects of that rule are indefensible.  
 149.  MORRIS-JONES, supra note 32, at 88. See also Rajeev Bhargava, 
Introduction: Outline of a Political Theory of the Indian Constitution, in THE 
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Another member of the Constituent Assembly, Ramnarayan Singh, 
expressed anguish not so much at the persistence of British 
institutions, but at the persistence of British attitudes: “The British 
have departed but I regret to say that our countrymen have not 
forsaken the ways of their former masters. We will experience much 
more difficulty in bidding goodbye to the ways of the British than we 
experienced in bidding goodbye to the British themselves.”150 
Arguments from colonial continuity were also voiced within the 
Assembly by members who were concerned about the persistence in 
the new Constitutional order of colonial institutions such as the 
Indian Civil Service and also outside the Assembly by those who 
deprecated the decision to adopt British institutions such as a 
Westminster-style Parliamentary system.151 In the early post-
Independence period, the idiom of colonial continuity was also used 
to criticize Government action to repress civil liberties.152 
These invocations of colonial continuities as terms of normative 
criticism persist in contemporary political debate. They typically take 
one of three forms. The first involves using the term “colonial” as a 
synonym for “alien” or “un-Indian”; Rajeev Bhargava calls this the 
POLITICS AND ETHICS OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 1, 31 (Rajeev Bhargava ed., 
2008) (describing grievances that an Indian Constitution modeled upon the 
constitutions of Westernized liberal democracies may resonate solely with the 
minority, Westernized, upper caste, and seem radically different for the rest of 
India’s more traditional population); De, Constitutional Antecedents, supra note 5 
(emphasizing further the general fear that India’s “slavish imitation” of typically 
Western constitutions would fail). 
 150.  See MORRIS-JONES, supra note 32, at 88 (referencing Gandhi’s famous 
deprecation in Hind Swarai of the desire of some Indian nationalists for “English 
rule without the Englishman”); M.K. Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, Indian Opinion (Dec. 
18, 1909).  
 151.  See POTTER, supra note 8, at 55-56 (theorizing why members of the former 
colonial system may be more open to increased democratization and impending 
constitutional change than observers may have expected); MORRIS-JONES, supra 
note 32, at 81 (quoting Professor Bodh Raj Sharma’s idea that “India has chosen 
[he writes] to be a camp follower of the West and is taking pride in its godless 
secularism and in the paraphernalia of parliamentary democracy which it has 
decided to adopt . . . . It is a matter of great sorrow that the new Constitution does 
not breathe the principles of Truth and Ahimsa” to demonstrate concern about 
India’s pursuit of a Western style constitution).  
 152.  See Arudra Burra, Arguments from Colonial Continuity: The Constitution 
(First Amendment) Act, 1950 (unpublished manuscript) (2008) for a discussion of 
this in the context of debates around the First Amendment to the Constitution in 
1951. 
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“cultural inadaptability thesis.”153 The second involves the use of the 
term “colonial” in a purely temporal context – as designating a 
colonial-era law, with the implication that such laws are 
anachronistic. The third involves using the term “colonial” as a 
stand-in for “repressive” or “authoritarian.” The following passage 
from a report on sedition laws in India invokes the second and third 
senses of the term “colonial”: 
A colonial legacy like sedition law, which presumes popular affection for 
the state as a natural condition and expects citizens not to show any 
enmity, contempt, hatred or hostility towards the government established 
by law, does not have a place in a modern democratic state like India. The 
case for repealing the law of sedition in India is rooted in its impact on the 
ability of citizens to freely express themselves as well as to constructively 
criticise or express dissent against their government. The existence of 
sedition laws in India’s statute books and the resulting criminalization of 
‘disaffection’ towards the state is unacceptable in a democratic society. 
These laws are clearly colonial remnants with their origin in extremely 
repressive measures used by the colonial government against nationalists 
fighting for Indian independence.154 
Finally, contemporary academic discussions of the post-colonial 
legal situation make heavy use of the idiom of colonial continuity. 
The present Symposium is one example of this tendency; another is a 
recent special issue of the Journal of Comparative Studies of South 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East, edited by Partha Chatterjee, on the 
topic of “Postcolonial Legalism.”155 In his introduction to this journal 
issue Chatterjee asks, “[w]hat is the significance of the prefix “post” 
in the term “postcolonial”? A minimal definition might go something 
like this: it is that which is temporally after the colonial but which 
nonetheless incorporates much of the colonial within it.156 
 153.  Rajeev Bhargava, Introduction: Outline of a Political Theory of the Indian 
Constitution, in THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 1, 30-31 
(Rajeev Bhargava ed., 2008). 
 154.  Centre for the Study of Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy, National 
Law School of India University, Sedition Law and the Death of Free Speech in 
India, BANGALORE & ALTERNATIVE L. F. 59 (2011).  
 155.  Partha Chatterjee, Postcolonial Legalism, 34 COMP. STUD. S. ASIA AFR. & 
MIDDLE E. 224, 224 (2014); see also Sandipto Dasgupta, A Language Which is 
Foreign to Us: Continuities and Anxieties in the Making of the Indian Constitution, 
34 COMP. STUD. S. ASIA AFR. & MIDDLE E. 228, 229 (2014). 
 156.  Chatterjee, supra note 155, at 224. 
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The main dissatisfaction with this formulation has to do, not with 
the definition of the postcolonial, but with the assumption that the 
category of the colonial is an unproblematic, descriptive one, at least 
when applied to laws and institutions. Our imagination of the 
colonial state is dominated by features of the state which are of 
interest to us because they seem to capture something essential about 
colonialism – domination, control, the operation of the rule of 
colonial difference. But an exclusive focus on these aspects of 
colonial rule prevent us from engaging with those aspects of the 
colonial state which were not directly concerned with advancing the 
colonial project.157 
To the extent that the term “colonial” is used to mark merely a 
temporal boundary, this article has argued that its use is incomplete 
unless one identifies which aspect of the colonial state is being 
referred to within this temporal period. To put the point another way, 
if the term “colonial” is being used to refer merely to any law or 
institution which owes its origins to the colonial period, then it 
cannot automatically identify colonial laws and institutions with the 
maintenance of imperial interests. Conversely, if our interest is in 
providing an accurate historical characterization of this pre-1947 
period, then the term “colonial” is not always helpful, precisely 
because of its association with the maintenance of imperial interests. 
A particularly vivid example of this is provided by Kalhan et. al. 
in their description of the colonial origins of police torture, which 
they cite as part of the explanation for widespread abuses by police 
in contemporary India.158 The authors go on to discuss the various 
norms of admissibility in the Indian Evidence Act and the Code of 
Criminal Procedure which were designed to limit such abuse.159 
What they fail to remark is the fact that these norms of admissibility 
were themselves products of colonial rule: concerns about torture in 
 157.  Mitra Sharafi offered the following colorful analogy to illustrate the point: 
imagine the state as a large fried egg with a yolk in the centre and white around it, 
with the yolk representing aspects of the state most closely associated with colonial 
rule in terms of domination and racism. It is tempting to think that most of the egg 
consists of the yolk; this article argues that lack of conceptual clarity about the 
term “colonial” may lead us to ignore the white.  
 158.  Kalhan et al., supra note 2, at 110 (demonstrated a classic invocation of 
the term “colonial continuity” in the first sense described in the introduction, as 
providing part of an explanation for some present-day ill). 
 159.  Id. at 119. 
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the police were so widespread in the early 1900s that the Fraser 
Commission recommended strengthening the norms of admissibility 
to prevent abuse of power by the police.160 Thus the practice of 
appointing Commissions to investigate police torture is as much a 
colonial inheritance as the torture itself.161 
In order to criticize the existence of sedition laws, or the practice 
of police torture, surely it is enough to cite the substantive reasons 
which make them unacceptable in the present? The fact that sedition 
laws can be used to stifle dissent in a democracy, or that torture is a 
serious violation of human rights, is argument enough in order to get 
rid of them. Calling them “colonial” may provide an additional 
rhetorical heft to this attack, but adds little that is substantive, for the 
colonial origins of a law are by themselves normatively neutral. If 
the argument of this article is correct, analytical clarity will be served 
best if questions and arguments posed in terms of colonial 
continuities are re-framed so as to remove the reference to the 
colonial, and focus our attention on more substantive issues. 
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 161.  Cf. id. at 110 (describing the complexity of post-colonial development: 
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